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Technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country to an-
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country
to another. For instance, during the early 17th century, Venice and Spanish Lombardy
were among the technologically most advanced regions in Europe (Davids 2008, p. 2).
Over the centuries, the technological center of gravity of Europe then moved, residing
at various times in Italy, southern Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, and then
again in Germany(Mokyr 1990, p. 207). Some economic historians even claim that the
US had begun to lose its technological leadership as early as the early 1990s (Nelson and
Wright 1992).
An important question is why such economic and technological leapfrogging takes
place. An equally fundamental question is why technological leapfrogging has repeat-
edly occurred. The rst question has been investigated in existing literature, in which
technological leapfrogging is triggered by major exogenous changes in technology (Brezis,
Krugman, and Tsiddon 1993).1 In contrast, the cause of perpetual cycles in technologi-
cal leapfrogging has scarcely been studied. While we may regard the perpetual cycles of
leapfrogging as responses to the perpetual exogenous changes in technology, this explana-
tion for leapfrogging cycles is essentially exogenous based on macro shocks in technology.
The present paper will show otherwise.
The aim of this analysis is to develop an endogenous theory that explains the perpetual
cycle in technological leadership as a market-driven equilibrium phenomenon. For this
purpose, we develop a new growth model that can capture how national technological
leadership endogenously moves between countries along an equilibrium dynamic path. In
doing this, we focus on endogenous innovation and international spillovers in a two-country
setting with the dynamic optimization of consumption and saving by an innitely-lived
consumer. As the rms in a country develop innovations by investing resources, the stock
of knowledge accumulates in the home country, and this subsequently but only partially
contributes to the accumulation of foreign knowledge because of international spillovers
through foreign direct investment (FDI).2
By regarding technological leadership as the state whereby a given country innovates
most among all countries, we demonstrate that technological leadership by that country
may shift to another country and then may alternate perpetually between the countries.
Specically, we obtain two main results. (a) The protability of innovation is low, only
the leading country innovates in equilibrium. In this case, leapfrogging never takes place.
(b) If the protability of innovation is su¢ ciently high, both leading and lagging countries
engage in innovation. In this case, technological leadership can shift over time and will
1See also Ohyama and Jones (1995), Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales (1997), Brezis and Tsiddon (1998),
van de Klundert and Smulders (2001), and Desmet (2002). The present paper essentially di¤ers from
those analyses in its focus on endogenous and perpetual cycles of leapfrogging, which will complement
them by clarifying the intrinsically cyclical nature of national technological leadership.
2As argued by Brezis (1995), foreign capital plays a role in industrialization and development processes.
We may also accept that international capital ows, as well as imports, are important channels for
international knowledge spillover, as discussed in the literature (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Feenstra
1996). See Branstetter (2006) for recent empirical evidence.
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perpetually move back and forth between countries along an equilibrium path if the
international knowledge spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient.
The key driving force behind endogenous and perpetual leapfrogging is the ability of a
country to learn from foreign innovations. For example, a lagging country may learn much
more from foreign innovations developed in a leading country than the leading country
learns from those developed in the lagging country. Meanwhile, domestic innovations take
place and build the knowledge stock in each country. The analysis formally shows that
leapfrogging is possible only when both countries innovate, where the lagging country
has a dual engine of knowledge growth consisting of domestic innovation and foreign
innovation di¤using by the spillovers. If a country can learn e¢ ciently from di¤use foreign
innovations, technological leadership will perpetually alternate between the countries. We
can easily elaborate on why both countries innovate in equilibrium; the protability of
innovation can be su¢ ciently high that innovation pays even for the technologically lagging
country. When the protability is low, the lagging country does not innovate and simply
receives the spillovers from foreign innovation, where no leapfrogging occurs. This implies
that the spillovers by themselves can only make the lagging country, at most, as innovative
as the leading country, but not more innovative.
The endogenous occurrence of perpetual leapfrogging is not new in the context of price
competition between rms. For instance, the important paper by Giovannetti (2001) con-
siders a duopoly in which rms considering innite technological adoption set prices with
Bertrand competition in the product market. Using this model, Giovannetti identies the
conditions whereby rms alternate in adopting the new technology, thereby representing
a leapfrogging process. He shows that demand conditions, such as price elasticities, play
a role in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition.
Lee, Kim, and Lim (2011) have provided recent empirical support for this contention. In
addition, some studies in the eld of economic geography address both the theory and the
empirical evidence of technological leapfrogging at the regional level (for example, Quah
1996a, b).3
The present study relates to the literature on innovation and growth cycles. In order
to capture the cyclical growth phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow Shleifer
(1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999), and Matsuyama
(1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only for a single period in a discrete time
model. This assumption implies that a single period is su¢ ciently long, which can be
somewhere around 20 years. Given that in reality, many innovated consumption goods
become obsolete before their patents expire, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
innovations are made obsolete in a single period (which is fairly long). In line with existing
studies, we assume the temporary nature of the monopoly enjoyed by innovators, which
plays a role in explaining leapfrogging cycles in the growth process.4
3See Athreye and Godley (2009), Giovannetti (2013), and Petrakos and Rodríguez-Pose, and Rovolis
(2005) for more recent research. In the political economy literature, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) provide
an endogenous explanation on a long cycle of stagnation and growth, similar to perpetual leapfrogging in
the present paper, by focusing on vested interests in determining policies. See also Aghion et al. (2002)
for perpetual leapfrogging at the rm level.
4See also Iwaisako and Tanaka (2012) for endogenous cycles in a NorthSouth product-cycle model
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In relation to this, in the present study, we view leapfrogging cycles as a discrete
phenomenon.5 This is in line with the literature on nonlinear equilibrium dynamics,
in which a discrete-time growth model is commonly used for explaining complicated,
real-world cycles (Nishimura and Yano 2008). Given that innovations often come in a
cluster (Shleifer 1986), we believe that the discrete-time model can be a reasonable choice
for explaining innovation-driven cycles such as leapfrogging in our model, although it
is also essential to address this issue in a continuous-time setting as in Francois and
Lloyd-Ellis (2003), who explain endogenous growth cycles in a continuous-time model of
Schumpeterian growth.6
This study provides an important contribution to the theoretical literature by devel-
oping a new growth model with the dynamic optimization of an innitely-lived consumer
that can explicitly capture how the (relative) national leadership in cutting-edge technol-
ogy endogenously moves between countries along an equilibrium path. The beauty of the
present model is that the equilibrium dynamical system is derived from the model as an
autonomous one-dimensional system, so that we can completely track and illustrate an
entire equilibrium path of the national technological leadership between countries for any
initial condition, by means of a tractable phase-diagram analysis. The result is novel to
existing literature in demonstrating the intrinsically cyclical nature of national technolog-
ical leadership; in our model, technological leadership endogenously uctuates between
countries on an equilibrium path. No research has addressed the equilibrium trajectory
of national technological leadership or its endogenous cycles between countries.
2 Model
Time is discrete and extends from  1 to +1. Consider two countries, A and B that
have identical preferences and di¤er only in their initial levels of innovation productivity.
The countries are denoted by i or h (i = h; B; h = A; B), using a superscript for variables
pertaining to the production side and a subscript for those pertaining to the consumption
side.
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption goods in each period t. Each good
is indexed by j. We follow the R&D-based endogenous growth model with expanding
variety (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991) by assuming innovation as generating
new varieties of goods. Given that we later allow for FDI, the country where a particular
rm innovates and manufactures may change. Let  i(t) be the set of goods that are
innovated in country i in period t, and let i(t) be the set of goods that are manufactured
in country i in period t.
with overlapping generations, in which innovation and imitation interact with each other to generate
perpetual uctuations in the world growth rate. In their model, however, there is no leapfrogging.
5See the discussion at the end of Section 3.3 on the use of a discrete-time model. See also footnote 12.
6See also Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008, 2009, 2013) for related studies.
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2.1 Consumption
In each country, an innitely lived representative consumer inelastically supplies L units
of labor for production and research and development (R&D) in every period. Note that
the two countries are assumed to have equal labor forces, L. Each consumer is endowed
with the same intertemporal utility function
Ui =
1X
t=0
t lnui(t);
where  2 (0; 1) is the time preference rate. Temporary utility ui(t) is dened on the set
fA(t)[B(t)g of goods manufactured in both countries (free trade), taking the standard
DixitStiglitz form:
ui(t) =
Z
j2fA(t)[B(t)g
xi(j; t)
1 dj
 1
1 
; (1)
where xi(j; t) is the consumption of good j in country i. Parameter  2 (0; 1) de-
notes an inverse measure of the elasticity of substitution. Let Ei(t) 
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g
p(j; t)xi(j; t)dj be the spending in country i, where p(j; t) denotes the price of good j:
Solving the utility maximization problem in (1) leads to the demand function for good j,
xi(j; t) = p(j; t)
 (1=)Ei(t)=P (t)1 (1=), where P (t) is the price index.7 Aggregating these
expressions, we obtain the derived aggregate demand, xA(j; t) + xB(j; t)  x(j; t), as
x(j; t) =
E(t)p(j; t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
; (2)
where E(t) = EA(t) +EB(t) is the aggregate spending in period t. The price elasticity of
demand is constant at  1 for any j.
Solving the dynamic optimization of the consumers utility for consumption and saving
decisions under the intertemporal budget constraint results in the usual Euler equation
Ei(t+ 1)=Ei(t) = (1 + r(t)), where r(t) is the interest rate in period t. We obtain
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= (1 + r(t)): (3)
2.2 Innovation, FDI, and manufacture
A single rm innovates and monopolistically supplies each di¤erentiated consumption
good.8 Innovating a new good takes one period. In each period, say t   1; a rm in
7As is well known, the index is dened as P (t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)
1 (1=)dj
 1
1 (1=)
.
8We assume this in order to make the analysis as simple as possible, consistent with the standard
endogenous growth framework. This implies that there is no adoption of innovation or an explicit market
for innovation. However, without any change in the results, it is possible to assume a more general model
with an innovation market in which innovation and manufacture are by di¤erent rms.
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country i can innovate one technology to produce a new di¤erentiated good at the end
of the period; t   1; by investing 1=Ki(t   1)  ki(t   1) units of domestic labor in
R&D activity.9 Here Ki(t   1) denotes the technology level in innovation for country i
in period t   1: In the subsequent period t; the rm will set up a production plant. In
doing this, the rm can choose the country in which to manufacture the good in order
to maximize monopolistic prots. In equilibrium, as foreign prots may be greater, the
rm may transfer production to a foreign country through FDI. This is the channel for
innovation di¤usion in our model.10
We assume a simple production technology. There are constant returns to scale in
the production of any good j and the productivity of labor is the same in both countries,
which is normalized to be one.11 The marginal cost in country i is thus equal to the wage
rate in country i, wi(t). When the rm chooses to manufacture in country i in period t;
captured by j 2 i(t); it produces x(j; t) units of good j by using labor in country i: The
standard prot maximization problem is written as
max
(p(j;t); x(j;t))
(j; t) = p(j; t)x(j; t)  wi(t)x(j; t)
subject to the market demand function (2). Since, by (2), the price elasticity of each good
j is constant at 1=; the rm sets a monopolistic price of p(j; t) = wi(t)=(1   )  pi(t).
By substituting this into (2), we obtain the demand and prot functions as
x(j; t) =
E(t)pi(t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
 xi(t) (4)
and
(j; t) = E(t)

pi(t)
P (t)
1 (1=)
 i(t) (5)
for j 2 i(t) (i = A; B). As rms prefer the country where prots are higher, the
discounted present value of the rm innovating in country i in period t 1 is expressed as
V i(t  1) = maxf
A(t); B(t)g
1 + r(t  1)   w
i(t  1) ki(t  1): (6)
In order to capture cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion possible, we follow
Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999) and
9We can extend the current deterministic innovation process to a stochastic form without any quali-
tative change of results.
10In line with the literature on international trade and growth (Lai 1998), we do not distinguish between
the various forms of production transfer, including fully and partly owned subsidiaries and licensing.
11Here we simply consider that e¢ ciency in manufacturing normalizes across countries. We can extend
this simple setting by allowing for country-specic manufacturing e¢ ciency and endogenous technologi-
cal progress. In such an extended model, we can easily verify that the comparative advantage between
R&D and manufacturing (rather than the absolute advantage in R&D) plays an important role in per-
petual leapfrogging, although the results and their implications for perpetual leapfrogging do not change
fundamentally.
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Matsuyama (1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only for one period.12 This as-
sumption implies that the length of a unit period is su¢ ciently long, which can be some-
where around 20 years given the duration of real-world patents. Given that in reality,
many innovated consumption goods become obsolete before their patent expires, we may
assume that innovations are made obsolete within a single period (which in our model is
fairly long).13 As shown below, this assumption makes the analysis tractable without any
fundamental change in the results.14 Finally, free entry guarantees that the net value of
a rm should not be positive in equilibrium: V i(t  1)  0 for each i.
2.3 Knowledge accumulation and spillovers
Technology in innovation Ki(t) advances with knowledge accumulation. Following Romer
(1990), we assume intertemporal knowledge spillovers in innovation: current innovations
contribute to the accumulation of the stock of knowledge Ki(t), with which the cost of
innovation, ki(t) = 1=Ki(t); reduces over time. Here, as is standard, the technology level
in innovation Ki(t) is interpreted as the knowledge stock in innovation.
The knowledge stock of a country consists of cumulative innovations of two types:
home and foreign innovations. Dene
N i(t) 
Z
 i(t)
dj and M i(t) 
Z
j2 f (t 1)\i(t)
dj: (7)
Here N i(t) denotes the number of innovations developed in country i in period t and
M i(t) denotes the number of innovations that occur in period t 1 in country f and then
ows into country i from country f in period t. Following Romer (1990), we assume that
the knowledge stock Ki(t) linearly depends on the sum of domestic innovations that are
developed up to the beginning of period t; i.e., N i(t  1)+N i(t  2)+   ; where N i(s) is
a familiar proxy for the ow of knowledge generated as a by-product of the innovations
in period s. We also assume that the international knowledge spillovers as an externality
accompany FDI, such that each country learns from its foreign innovation inows. Hence
the knowledge stock of country i also depends on the sum, M i(t   1) +M i(t   2) +  
: Accordingly, we simply describe the knowledge stock using
Ki(t) =
tX
s= 1
 
N i(s  1) + M i(s  1) with   1; (8)
12This assumption implies that all patents start and expire at the same time, although in reality patents
overlap. We may deal with this undesirable property by interpreting the length of a period as very long
(e.g., 40 years) and dividing each period into subperiods (e.g., two 20-year periods), although we need a
continuous-time model to x this problem completely. In the present paper, we view leapfrogging as a
discrete-time phenomenon and leave this issue for future work.
13This assumption may also be justied if each innovation is interpreted as fairly specic. For example,
innovationin this model would be represented by the specic innovation associated with iPhone 4S or
smartphones instead of cell phones or information technology more generally.
14Note that, in the next subsection, we assume that obsolete innovations stay alivein the sense that
they continue to contribute to the current knowledge stock, although they are not explicitly traded in
the marketplace. Whether they are traded or not is not important for our main story explained later.
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where the parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the e¢ ciency of the contribution of international
knowledge spillovers through foreign innovation inows to knowledge accumulation and
thus technological progress occurs. The e¢ ciency of international knowledge spillovers
increases with . If  = 1, spillovers are as e¢ cient as domestic spillovers; if  = 0, there
is no learning at all from foreign innovations. For the sake of explanation, we rewrite (8)
as a ow as follows
Ki(t+ 1) Ki(t) = N i(t) + M i(t): (9)
Considering (9), one may conjecture that spillovers M i(t) by themselves can cause a
reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t): Ki(t+1) < Kf (t+1) might hold by taking a su¢ ciently large
M f (t): Leapfrogging may be able to occur simply through spillover M f (t). However, this
conjecture is not the case with the present model because the example (of such a large
MB(t)) is not consistent with (8) and (9) for the following reason. Equation (8) says that
innovation in country i; N i(t 1); not only contributes to the foreign knowledge; Kf (t+1);
through spillovers of M f (t)(= N i(t  1)) but also increases the domestic knowledge Ki(t)
in the previous period. Therefore, it is not possible to arbitrarily take a large M f (t) with
Ki(t) constant. As M f (t) becomes large, by (8), Ki(t) and Ki(t+1) must also become large
at a higher rate than, or at least the same rate as, Kf (t+ 1) does. We cannot articially
make Ki(t + 1) < Kf (t + 1) by controlling M f (t) only. As we will see later, a su¢ cient
number of domestic innovations, N f (t); is essential for the reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t) (i.e.,
leapfrogging). In summary, so long as we choose an identical equilibrium path, spillovers
M f (t) by themselves cannot cause a reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t):
It is also worth pointing out that in (8) and (9), we assume that knowledge develops
horizontally, rather than vertically. That is, we assume that knowledge accumulates as in-
novations are added to old innovations, not as innovations replace old innovations. What
we see by this way of modeling knowledge accumulation is that current cutting-edge tech-
nologies/products (e.g., motor engine; smartphone; hybrid car) are often based on obsolete
ones (e.g., steam engine; landline phone; gas-fueled car). The old technologies/products
are made obsolete by the new ones and disappear from the marketplace, but the under-
lying concepts with the old technologies are incorporated into the new state-of-the-art
technologies/products. Furthermore, our horizontal modeling of knowledge accumulation
also implies that a country innovates along di¤erent lines to the other country, rather
than along the same line. This captures that technologies or products made in di¤erent
countries are sometimes di¤erentiated, at least slightly. Thus, the knowledge stock of
country i can accumulate as foreign innovations (M i(t)) are simply added to, rather than
replace or be replaced by, the own innovations (N i(t)). Although clearly the results would
become richer if the model also included the knowledge stock as a vertical ladder or the
replacement of technologies, in this study, we focus on the above-mentioned horizontal
aspect of knowledge with (8) and (9), which can help us highlight our main point.
3 Technological Leadership in Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we prove the main result that technological leadership may endogenously
uctuate over time, thereby perpetually moving back and forth between countries along
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an equilibrium path. Before proceeding, we provide a formal denition of the concept
of technological leadership. Taking into account the notion in economic history (Davids
2008),15 we refer to a country that develops the most innovations among the countries
as the technological leader, and a country that develops few innovations as a lagging
country. In the present model, and as will be made apparent later, this denition is
equivalent to that in existing literature, which denes leadership as the state whereby a
given country has the highest productivity among the countries. Thus, in equilibrium,
country i innovates more if and only if its innovation productivity is higher; N i(t) >
N f (t) if and only if Ki(t) > Kf (t): For simplicity, we use Ki(t) > Kf (t) to designate
country i as the technological leader, and we refer to any reversal of the leading position
as technological leapfrogging.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country A is the leading country in period
t, KA(t) > KB(t) (and thus NA(t) > NB(t) to be shown in equilibrium), and we refer to
this situation as regime A. If KA(t) < KB(t) (and thus NA(t) < NB(t) to be shown in
equilibrium), we refer to it as regime B.
In any period of time, this model can be regarded as a variant of a conventional two-
good Ricardian model, where the two outputs considered are innovation and production.
Given KA(t) > KB(t), there are potentially three possible specialization patterns in
period t: (1) one in which both countries engage in manufacturing, (2) one in which both
countries engage in R&D, and (3) one in which both countries are specialized. It is useful
to dene a new variable, N(t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g dj; which is the total number of goods
manufactured in t, satisfying N(t) = NA(t  1) +NB(t  1):
3.1 No Leapfrogging
Suppose that both countries produce goods. In this case, only the leading country A
innovates, and both countries manufacture in equilibrium. That is,  A(t) 6= ; and  B(t) =
;: By (7), we have NA(t) > 0 and NB(t) = 0. By N(t+1) = NA(t)+NB(t); we also have
N(t+1) = NA(t): As this situation is similar to the NorthSouth product-cycle model à la
Krugman (1979) and Helpman (1993) where only the North innovates and both the North
and the South manufacture, we may refer to this pattern as a NorthSouth regime.16
As manufacturing takes place in both countries, the wages are internationally equalized,
wA(t) = wB(t) = w(t), implying pi(t) = p(t) and thus xi(t) = x(t) by (4).
Only the leading country A innovates, so the free-entry condition holds as V A(t) =
0 > V B(t):17 Under the equalization of wages, pi(t) = p(t); using (5), the discounted
15Davids (2008) considered that a country that has technological leadership plays an initiating role in
the development of new technologies across a wide variety of elds.
16Here, we assume that the North is a country that innovates; however, if the North (the South)
was dened as a country where the wage rate is higher (lower) as is also usual in the literature, these
North/South labels could be misleading. Nevertheless, we use these labels because we can easily control
the international wage di¤erential in the present model by incorporating into the model an international
di¤erential in manufacturing productivity.
17More specically, free entry in country A requires V A(t) = 0: No innovation in country B implies
V B(t) < 0:
9
present value of an innovation in country i in (6) can be expressed as
V i(t) =
1
1 + r(t)
E(t+ 1)
N(t+ 1)
  wi(t) ki(t): (10)
Substituting into (10) the Euler equation 1 + r(t) = E(t + 1)= (E(t)) from (3), the
free-entry condition V A(t) = 0 > V B(t) requires
E(t)
N(t+ 1)
= w(t) kA(t) < w(t) kB(t): (11)
The rst equality in (11) ensures that the discounted value of an innovation (E(t)=NA(t))
and the cost (w(t) kA(t)) are balanced in the leading country A. The second inequality in
(11) ensures that the cost of an innovation is lower in the leading country (w(t)kA(t)) than
the lagging country B (w(t)kB(t)). Noting ki(t) = 1=Ki(t); this implies KA(t) > KB(t);
the leading country A has accumulated more knowledge up to period t:
The labor market-clearing conditions for country i is given by
L =
Z
 i(t)
ki(t)dj +
Z
i(t)
xi(t)dj: (12)
The quantity of a good, xi(t); can be derived from (4) and (7) as xi(t) = (1 )E(t)= (w(t)N(t))
for each i: Together with this, by eliminating the country index i from (12),18 we can ob-
tain the world labor constraint as
2L = NA(t) kA(t) + (1  )E(t)
w(t)
; (13)
in which  B(t) = ; is used. The left-hand side in (13) is the world supply of labor, and the
right-hand side is the world demand for labor from both the innovation sector in leading
country A and the manufacturing sectors in both countries.
In order to determine the equilibrium ow of innovation made in period t; we will
eliminate the term E(t)=w(t) from the world labor market-clearing condition (13), using
the free-entry condition (11). Then, noting kA(t) = 1=KA(t) and N(t + 1) = NA(t), the
ow of innovation in period t is derived as
NA(t) = KA(t)
2L
1 + 
and NB(t) = 0; (14)
where   =(1   ): Here  captures the discounted present value of a markup over
the rms marginal cost, which increases with the time preference  and decreases with
the elasticity of substitution  1:19 We refer to  as the protability of an innovation.
18We do this by summing up both sides of (12) over i:
19Li (2001) argues that the evidence regarding whether there is any conventional value or a range of
values for the elasticity of substitution is inconclusive. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) show
that the elasticity of substitution is, on average, greater than two, but tends to decline over time and is
actually less than two in some sectors (e.g., motor vehicles).
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Equation (14) shows that the innovation ow NA(t) increases with the knowledge stock
KA(t) and the protability of an innovation.
Now we can derive the number of goods that are manufactured in each country. Noting
(12) with  B(t) = 0; we have L =
R
B(t)
xB(t)dj: Then, by (11) and (14), we obtainZ
A(t)
dj

=
1 
2
N(t) and
Z
B(t)
dj

=
1 + 
2
N(t): (15)
To ensure that the leading country A manufactures, i.e.,
R
A(t)
dj > 0; we need to impose
 < 1:20 (16)
This requires that the time preference  is small and the price elasticity of substitution
 1 is high.
So far, we have four important conditions. Inequality (16) guarantees that only the
leading country innovates in equilibrium. InequalityKA(t) > KB(t) requires that country
A becomes the leading country. Equations (14) and (15) determine the innovation ow
and the fractions of manufactured goods, respectively.
In what follows, we demonstrate that in the NorthSouth regime, leapfrogging never
takes place even if the spillovers are completely e¢ cient ( = 1). By (14) and (9), the
growth of knowledge can be expressed as follows:
KA(t+ 1) =

2L
1 + 
+ 1

KA(t) (17)
and
KB(t+ 1) = MB(t) +KB(t); (18)
where MB(t) =
R
B(t)
dj = (1 + )N(t)=2 by (15).
As KA(t) is given by history, (17) fully determines the growth of knowledge for the
leading country A. Apparently, (18) does not determine KB(t+1) without any additional
historical assumption because the level of MB(t) = (1 + )N(t)=2 depends on N(t) =
NA(t   1) + NB(t   1); which is determined by innovation activities undertaken in the
previous period, t  1. So far, we do not have any assumption on innovation activities in
period t 1 or before. Nevertheless, as shown in our rst theorem, regardless of innovation
activities in the past, leapfrogging never takes place in the NorthSouth regime.
Theorem 1 (No leapfrogging with lower protability) Suppose that the protabil-
ity of an innovation  falls below 1: Then, under the innitely lived agents dynamic
optimization, only the leading country innovates in equilibrium (the North-South regime).
In this case, leapfrogging never takes place.
20This condition also guarantees that the resource condition for the leading country A; NA(t)=AA(t) <
L; is satised.
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Proof. By (16),  < 1 ensures that only the leading country innovates. By (15),MB(t) =
(1 + )N(t)=2: (a) Assume KA(t   1) > KB(t   1): By the expression of NA(t   1) in
(14), with KA(t  1) = NA(t  1) +KA(t) from (9), substituting N(t) = NA(t  1) into
(18) derives
KB(t+ 1) = KA(t)
L(1 + )
(2L+ 1) + 1
+KB(t): (19)
From (17) and (19), we can show that KA(t + 1) > KB(t + 1) holds so long as KA(t) >
KB(t); noting  < 1 and  < 1: (b) Assume KA(t 1) < KB(t 1): By symmetry, noting
N(t) = NB(t  1), the analogous procedures derive
KB(t+ 1) =

L(1 + )
(2L+ 1) + 1
+ 1

KB(t): (20)
From (17) and (20), KA(t+1) > KB(t+1) holds so long as KA(t) > KB(t); given  < 1
and  < 1: This proves that KA(t) > KB(t) cannot be reversed for the subsequent period
when  < 1; whether either country is a leading country in the previous period t  1:
We now elaborate upon the intuition why economies with the lower protability of
innovation cannot experience leapfrogging. There are potentially two sources of leapfrog-
ging: knowledge growth from domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation.
In this regime, however, the lagging country (country B) only has spillovers from MB(t);
the foreign innovations developed in the leading country (country A). No domestic innova-
tions take place in the lagging country. Given that the leading country also gains from the
innovations MB(t) (which are included in KA(t)) even more e¢ ciently than, or at least
equally to, the lagging country, the spillovers alone can only make the lagging country
as innovative as, but not more innovative than, the leading country. Thus, leapfrogging
never takes place. As shown later, if the lagging country not only has spillovers from the
leading country, but also innovates by itself, leapfrogging will be possible.
Why does only the leading country innovate when  < 1? Since  = = (1  ) ;
lower  is associated with lower  and higher  1: A lower time preference  results in a
higher interest rate r(t); which decreases the discounted value of the prot (t). A higher
elasticity of substitution  1 implies a lower markup ratio (1=1   ) and a lower prot
(t): The inequality condition  < 1 intuitively requires that the discounted value for an
innovation is fairly low. That is, the value is too low for the lagging country B to innovate
by itself. In other words, where the protability of an innovation  (depending on the
time preference rate  and the elasticity of substitution  1) is higher, the discounted
benet from an innovation would be higher and thus innovation would be protable, even
for rms in the lagging country. Finally, we may summarize this by stating that: when the
protability of an innovation is low, leapfrogging does not take place because the lagging
country does not innovate.
3.2 An illustration
To illustrate further the international dynamics of knowledge in the NorthSouth regime,
we assume that the leading country A has retained leadership in the past; i.e., NA(s) >
12
0 = NB(s) and thus KA(s) > KB(s) for s = t; t 1;   : This consideration is reasonable
given that Theorem 1 shows that leapfrogging never takes place. The growth of knowledge
follows (17) and (19) for any s  t: Dene  (t) = KA(t)=(KA(t) +KB(t)); which stands
for the knowledge ratio for country A: We can derive the dynamic system for  (t) as
follows. Noting KA(t) > KB(t),
 (t+ 1) =
(a1 + 1) (t)
1 + (a1 + a2) (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; 1); (21)
where a1 and a2 are positive numbers determined by ; ; and L:21 By applying the above
procedures to the case of  (t) 2 (0; 0:5) where country B is the leading country, we can
easily derive the following dynamic system:
 (t+ 1) =
(1  a2) (t) + a2
1 + (1   (t)) (a1 + a2) for  (t) 2 (0; 0:5): (22)
Note that a1 < 1 and a2 < 1 if  < 1: We thus can verify that so long as  < 1; the
steady state is unique and higher than 0:5 for (21) and lower than 0:5 for (22).
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram for systems (21) and (22) with their steady
states,  A and  

B. As shown, any path starting in the situation where country A (B)
is the leading country stably converges to a steady state;  (s) > (<)0:5 for all s > t if
 (t) > (<)0:5: Thus, this phase diagram shows that no leapfrogging occurs in the case
where the protability of an innovation is lower.
3.3 Leapfrogging cycles
Let us now consider the situation where both countries innovate (pattern (2)), which is
realized when  > 1, as explained below. In this case, only the lagging country, B;
manufactures. Then we have NA(t) > 0 and NB(t) > 0; N(t + 1) = NA(t) + NB(t): In
contrast to the previous case, both countries innovate in equilibrium. For convenience
sake, we refer to this specialization pattern as a NorthNorth regime. Because innovation
takes place in both countries, by the free-entry condition V A(t) = V B(t) = 0; the cost
of an innovation is internationally equated; wA(t)kA(t) = wB(t)kB(t). Manufacturing
takes place only in country B; so that A(t + 1) < B(t + 1) must hold, which implies
wA(t) > wB(t): Thus, the following inequality must hold in this case: kA(t) < kB(t):
Substituting the Euler equation (3) into the value of innovation (10), the free-entry
condition of V A(t) = V B(t) = 0 implies
E(t)
N(t+ 1)
= wA(t)kA(t) = wB(t)kB(t): (23)
The interpretation of (23) is similar to that of (11).
21The formal denitions are:
a1  2L1+ and a2  L(1+)1+(2L+1) :
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By applying A(t) = ; to the labor condition (12), we can easily determine the ow
of innovation for the leading country A as
NA(t) = LKA(t): (24)
By using (4) and the monopolistic pricing pB(t) = wB= (1  ), xB(t) = (1 )E(t)=(N(t)wB(t))
is obtained. Substituting this into the labor market condition (12), with (23), we can also
determine the ow of innovation for the lagging country B as
NB(t) =
1
1 + 
 
LKB(t)  LKA(t) : (25)
Equation (25) shows that the innovation ow in the lagging country NB(t) increases
with the domestic knowledge stock KB(t) but decreases with the foreign knowledge stock
KA(t): In order to ensure that the lagging country also innovates, NB(t) > 0; by (25), we
need to assume
 >
KA(t)
KB(t)
> 1; (26)
which requires that the international technological gap, KA(t)=KB(t); is not very large.
To allow (26) to be feasible, we need to impose
 > 1: (27)
Condition (27) requires that the protability of an innovation is high; the time preference
rate  is large and/or and the elasticity of substitution  1 is low.
What if the knowledge gap, KA(t)=KB(t); is larger than ? The specialization pattern
then goes to case (3), where both countries are specialized such that the leading country
innovates and the lagging country manufactures. We may refer to this as a full North
South regime. In this case, the wage rate in the lagging country is determined by its labor
market-clearing condition L = N(t)xB(t) as wB(t) = (1  )E(t)=L: The innovation ow
in the leading country A NA(t) does not change from (24) while that in the lagging
country B is zero (NB(t) = 0). The condition for the full NorthSouth regime is
KA(t)
KB(t)
>  > 1: (28)
To prove that leapfrogging may take place here, we assume (26). In proving this, we
suppose that country A retains leadership for two consecutive periods. That is, (26) holds
for two periods, t and t  1: This implies that spillovers MB(t) are equal to NA(t  1) =
LKA(t   1) because innovations developed by country A in period t   1 all ow to the
lagging country B:
By substituting (24) and (25) into (9), with MA(t) = 0 and MB(t) = LKA(t  1); the
growth of knowledge follows
KA(t+ 1) = LKA(t)| {z }
NA(t): domestic innovation
+KA(t); (29)
KB(t+ 1) =
LKB(t)  LKA(t)
1 + | {z }
NB(t): domestic innovation
+
L
L+ 1
KA(t)| {z }
MB(t): spillovers
+ KB(t): (30)
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In (30), the lagging country B has two sources of knowledge growth, namely, domestic
innovation NB(t) and spillovers from foreign innovation MB(t); which sharply contrast
with the NorthSouth regime where the lagging country does not innovate. By combining
(29) and (30), we derive the international dynamics of knowledge as
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L
L+1
 (t) +
 
L
1+
+ 1
 ; (31)
given 0:5 <  (s) < 
1+
for s = t; t  1 coming from (26).
Using (31), the following theorem formally proves the perpetual cycle of leapfrogging
as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Theorem 2 (Leapfrogging cycles with higher protability) Suppose that the prof-
itability of an innovation  exceeds 1 + 2L and that the international technological gap
KA(s)=KB(s) is lower than  for s = t; t   1: Then, under dynamic optimization by
the innitely lived agent, both the leading country and the lagging country innovate in
equilibrium (the NorthNorth regime). In this case, neither country may be able to retain
its technological leadership for innite sequential periods; i.e., leapfrogging may take place
repeatedly and perpetually along an equilibrium path. Specically, this occurs if
 2

2 (L+ 1)
1 + 
; 1

: (32)
Proof. First, by (26),  > 1 and KA(s)=KB(s) <  ensure that both countries innovate.
The steady state of system (31) is uniquely given by
  =
1

L+ 1
1 + 
;
which is less than 0:5 so long as (32) holds. If   < 0:5; given (31),  (t) will stably
decrease and eventually fall below 0:5: This shows that when country A has leadership
for two periods (t and t   1), it can never retain its leadership for an innite number
of sequential periods. Put di¤erently, technological leadership is always temporary. By
symmetry, it is straightforward to show the opposite case where country B initially has
leadership for two periods. This proves the perpetual occurrence of leapfrogging, taking
into account the fact that for the case where a country initially has leadership for just one
period, either the country retains leadership for two periods or is immediately leapfrogged.
Finally, by the assumption of  > 1 + 2L; the condition (32) is feasible.
Theorem 2 implies that when the protability of an innovation  is high enough,
the discounted benet from an innovation is high and thus innovation can be protable
even for rms in the lagging country. Both countries innovate in equilibrium, in which
case leapfrogging can take place if the e¢ ciency of international spillovers  is reasonably
high. It is worth pointing out that leapfrogging can take place even if  < 1, i.e., the
international spillovers are not completely e¢ cient. We summarize this as a proposition.
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Proposition 1 So long as the protability of innovation is su¢ ciently high, leapfrogging
can take place endogenously and perpetually if the international knowledge spillovers are
reasonably e¢ cient. Even if the spillovers are not completely e¢ cient, leapfrogging is still
possible to occur in equilibrium.
The key driving force behind leapfrogging cycles is the dual growth engine of a lag-
ging country. In the NorthNorth regime, which results from higher protability ; the
lagging country both innovates and manufactures. Thus, the lagging countrys knowledge
accumulates not only through its own innovations but also through the ow of spillovers
from the leading countrys innovations. In this sense, the growth engine of knowledge in
the lagging country is dual: innovating by itself and learning from abroad.22 Although
the leading country innovates faster than the lagging country, knowledge growth in the
leading country is driven only by domestic innovations. This creates the possibility of
leapfrogging.
Needless to say, our analysis has some limitations that arise from the model specica-
tion. Let us briey discuss them. First, specialization takes place in the present model,
which is a dynamic version of the Ricardian model. In reality, the leading country also
manufactures foreign innovations (those in the lagging country) and may also learn from
them. In addition, in history, no country seems to have ever been specialized in R&D.
Therefore, this model would capture some particular aspect of real-world behavior. That
is, lagging countries may have an advantage in international technology competition with
the leading country because they can learn from the leaders active innovation as well as
their own experience in innovation. Otherwise, we could easily remove this unrealistic
aspect concerning specialization from the model by assuming, for instance, a strictly con-
cave production function in manufacturing. Since this would make the analysis intractable
without adding new insights, we adopt the present setting for simplicity.
Second, given the historical fact that technology leadership has often shifted between
countries, it is important to provide an extended case comprising more than two countries.
We can demonstrate that three or more countries on an equilibrium path can perpetually
experience various forms of leapfrogging including, for example, growth miracles (Mat-
suyama 2007), in which the least productive country leapfrogs all rival countries with
higher productivity levels in a single burst. Such growth miracles may take place sporad-
ically or consecutively or in some complex combination; see Furukawa (2012) for a formal
analysis.
Third, we assume that countries are basically homogeneous, in order to explain the
mechanism through which leapfrogging occurs endogenously in a clear-cut way. Allowing
for country heterogeneity, we can demonstrate that leapfrogging may take place nite
times in the model where the countries have di¤erent labor endowments and/or e¢ ciency
levels of the spillovers.23
Finally, and most importantly, because the model assumes discrete time, it is implicitly
assumed that the leading country takes a long time to exploit its technological advantage
22Recall that in the NorthSouth regime, knowledge growth in the lagging country results only from
foreign innovations, in which leapfrogging is not possible (Theorem 1).
23The formal analysis is available upon request from the author.
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and in the meantime allows the lagging country to take over. One may wonder why the
leading country waits so long. The simple answer to this question is that, in each period,
rms in the leading country only pursue a one-period monopoly and thus they do not
care if the leadership of their home country persists or not. For example, if we introduce
into the model a welfare-maximizing government that gives subsidies to innovating rms,
a policy game between international governments may lead to a di¤erent situation where
the leading country does not wait so long. However, because innovations often take a very
long time from startup to implementation and come in bunches,24 the government in the
leading country cannot see in real time what happens in the lagging country, because of
asymmetric information. Given this, the only thing the leading country can do may be
simply to wait and see what happens in the lagging country.
Of course, it is potentially necessary to extend our discrete-time analysis to contin-
uous time. In a continuous-time setting, it is essential to consider what happens as the
technology levels of two countries become equal in the process of leapfrogging. One pos-
sible way forward would be to focus on technological complementarity between countries.
Spillovers from the leading country then combine with the backward technology of the
lagging country, so our leapfrogging mechanism should work in a continuous-time setting.
We leave this fundamental issue associated with discrete time for future work.
3.4 An illustration
To illustrate, we again use a phase diagram. However, the conguration of the phase
diagram depends on the history, i.e., which country was a leading country in the previous
period. As this is simply a problem of visual complication, to clarify the illustration, we
assume that innovation activities are completed within one period. Thus, the innovation
value in (6) should be replaced by
V i(t) = maxfA(t); B(t)g   wi(t)ki(t): (33)
Noting that  > 0:5 holds if (26) or (28) holds, we can describe the international
dynamics of knowledge as follows.25
 (t+ 1) = ( (t)) 
8>>>><>>>>:
L+(1 L) (t)
1+(1+)L(1  (t)) for  (t) 2 (0; 1  )
( (1 ))L+(1+(1 )L) (t)
L+1+L(1  (t)) for  (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5)
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+L+L (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; )
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+(1+)L (t)
for  (t) 2 (; 1)
: (34)
The equilibrium dynamic system  is autonomous and nonlinear. Figure 2 depicts the
phase diagram of system  for  < 2(1 ). There are two steady states, both of which are
stable. For all initial points, technological leadership can never alternate internationally.
In this case of  < 2(1   ) where the spillovers are less e¢ cient (small ), the result
24This issue is intensively investigated in the literature on innovation cycles (see Shleifer 1986).
25See Appendix A for the derivations.
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is essentially identical to that in the NorthSouth regime; that is, no leapfrogging takes
place.
There are two subcases with (a)  < (1   )= and (b) (1   )= < : In case (a),
even if the advantage of the leading country is initially very small ( (t) is around 0:5),
the knowledge gap stably widens and the world economy nally converges to the steady
state ( i ) in the full NorthSouth regime. The two countries, even though both innovate
initially, will eventually split into innovative and non-innovative countries, in which the
outcome is ultimately determined by the initial (small) knowledge di¤erence. In case (b),
 (t) converges to the steady state ( i ), in which case both countries innovate in the long
run.
Most importantly, Figure 3 depicts a typical path for the case in which  > 2(1  ).
Given that no steady state exists, the international knowledge fraction  (t) will move
perpetually back and forth between the two regimes (0; 0:5) and (0:5; 1). Finally, note
that the condition of leapfrogging cycles in the simplied model,  > 2(1 ); is analogous
to (32).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we developed a two-region endogenous innovation model with dynamic
optimization of the innitely lived consumer, in which knowledge di¤uses internationally
through FDI. The major nding is that technological leadership may shift internationally,
perpetually moving back and forth between countries if the protability of an innova-
tion is higher and the spillovers are relatively e¢ cient. Specically, if the protability
of an innovation is lower, in equilibrium, only the leading country innovates. In this
case, leapfrogging never arises. If the protability of an innovation is higher, in equilib-
rium, both countries innovate. In this case, leapfrogging perpetually takes place along an
equilibrium path if international spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient. In a big picture, we
may say that the growth process of an international economy can be intrinsically cycli-
cal depending on the factors such as the protability of innovation and the e¢ ciency of
international spillovers.
Our result shows the possibility that lagging countries leapfrog in spite of innovating
less, by focusing on learning from foreign innovation as a missing link. In this sense,
the present paper is close to Glass (1999) in spirit. With some examples from Asian
countries including South Korea or China,26 Glass (1999) considers whether learning from
foreign innovation through imitation can serve as a stepping stone enabling rms from
lagging countries to undertake innovation. The present paper extends Glasss (1999) view
by demonstrating that the e¤ectiveness of learning may be a key factor in enabling the
lagging country to leapfrog the leading country by shifting to an innovative economy.
To grasp the essence of leapfrogging cycles, we have left some important issues for
future work. First, we have conceptualized essentially homogeneous countries. Departing
26See Carolan, Singh, and Talati (1998).
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from this, we would be able to investigate various patterns of leapfrogging, including one-
time or terminal leapfrogging. Second, given heterogeneous countries, to consider which
country nally prevails may attract policy-related researchers to leapfrogging issues. For
example, the government of a country may a¤ect the process of leapfrogging by means of
policy, including subsidies, tari¤s, competition policies, and institutional reforms. In pur-
suing this line of research, it could be interesting to investigate the Nash equilibrium in a
policy game where each government maximizes domestic welfare. Third, as an alternative,
it may be fruitful to relate the degree of international spillovers to the legal protection
of intellectual property, a prominent issue in international relations. Strengthening the
domestic level of intellectual property protection may or may not delay the timing of a
country to leapfrog (or be leapfrogged). It may even deprive it of the opportunity to
leapfrog.
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Appendix A
In the NorthNorth regime:
(A) Assume 
1  >
KA(t)
KB(t)
> 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (0:5; )). The free-entry condition (23)
becomes
E(t)
NA(t) +NB(t)
=
wi(t)
Ki(t)
: (A1)
Given the labor condition for the leading country A, we have
NA(t) = LKA(t): (A2)
By the labor condition for the lagging country, L =
 
NB(t)=KB(t)

+
 
NA(t) +NB(t)

xB(t);
with xB(t) = (1 )E(t)
(NA(t)+NB(t))wB(t)
; we thus have
NB(t) = LKB(t)  (1  )LKA(t); (A3)
in which wB(t) is eliminated using (A1). Noting MB(t) = NA(t) here, by (9), we can
have the dynamic system as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L (t) + L+ 1
for  (t) 2 (0:5; ) : (A4)
Note that  > 0:5 holds in the NorthNorth regime.
(B) Assume 1 

< K
A(t)
KB(t)
< 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5)). Due to the symmetry,
NA(t) = LKA(t)  (1  )LKB(t) and NB(t) = LKB(t) (A5)
hold. We can also derive
 (t+ 1) =
( + (  1))L+ (1 + (1  )L) (t)
L+ 1 + L (1   (t)) for  (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5) : (A6)
In the full NorthSouth regime:
(A) Assume K
A(t)
KB(t)
> 
1  > 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (; 1)). The leading country innovates
following
NA(t) = LKA(t) and NB(t) = 0: (A7)
The lagging country receives spillovers MB(t) = NA(t); with   1:27 Then, the
knowledge dynamics is as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (t)
for  (t) 2 (; 1) : (A8)
27By using the labor market condition for the lagging country B and the free-entry condition, we can
easily verify that
AA(t)
AB(t)
>
wA(t)
wB(t)
=

1   > 1
holds.
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(B) Assume K
A(t)
KB(t)
< 1 

< 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (0; 1  )). Due to the symmetry, NA(t) = 0
and NB(t) = LKB(t); with MA(t) = NB(t): We can easily have
 (t+ 1) =
L+ (1  L) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (1   (t)) for  (t) 2 (0; 1  ) : (A9)
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